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Abstract 
 The volume of empirical literature on Ghana’s democratization is overwhelming. Two 
contrasting positions have come to dominate the Ghanaian democratization political 
discourses. While some Afro-optimist scholars argue that Ghana is the model of democracy 
in Africa and hence it is in the era of democratic triumphalism,  on the contrary, other Afro-
pessimist scholars contend that Ghana has since independence been experiencing a complex 
and contradictory historical  legacy of democratic governance - where liberalism exists side 
by side with patronage politics and hence it is still in the era of trial of democracy. Thegoal of 
this paper is to investigate how Ghana’s democratic governance exists side by side with 
widespread cronyism and nepotism.  The data for this paper came from scholarly articles, 
newspaper reports, and in-depth interviews.. This paper draws a number of conclusions. First, 
on the theoretical level, Ghana has a beacon of democratic rule and hence it is a model of 
Africa’s democracy. Second, empirically, the country’s relative electoral democratic success 
story is largely cosmetic due to pervasive cronyism and nepotism which impede active civic 
political participation. It thus, recommends institutional reforms not only to promote 
domestication and socialization of democratic norms, culture and values but also making it 
internalizeable and enforceable. 
 
Keywords:  Democratic Triumphalism, Trial of Democracy, Cronyism, Nepotism, Cosmetic 
Democratic Gains 
 
Introduction 
 As with many countries in Africa or elsewhere in the developing world in general and 
Ghana in particular, persistent militarism and military adventurism  resulted in the interplay 
of democratic and authoritarian regimes coupled withconstant regime changesin Ghana’s 
geopoliticsin the mid-1960s to the late 1980s(Hutchful, 1989; Fobih, 2011).As it is to be 
expected, from the 1960s to the late 1980s, Ghana’s democracy underwent seriesof chequered 
transformation processes.Ghana has since the mid-1960sbeen experiencing a contradictory 
historical legacy of democratic governance (van de Walle, 2005; Abdulai,2009).  However, 
the shift at the turn of the 21st century in the development paradigm and policies of the donor 
countries including the United States and the Bretton-Woods Institutionschanged the political 
dynamics in many African countries of which Ghana is no exception– from the dominance of 
authoritarian informal or personal rule to the reestablishment of fledgling multiparty 
democracies (Akwetey, 2005; van de Walle, 2005).Despite the uneven trends in the 
development of democracy, a few of many “Third-wave”democracies36 in Africa including 
Ghana have beenstriving hard tosustain and consolidate their democracies (Ayee, 2001). 
                                                          
36 Some African countries that are said to have made relative electoral democratic gains include, Botswana, 
Mauritius, South Africa, Cape Verde and of course, Ghana, among other relatively successful emerging 
democracies. 
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 This paper argues that Ghana has made relatively significant progress in deepening its 
electoral democraticprocesssince the 1992 democratic transition and this is exemplified by 
the 2000 and 2008democratic turnovers.  However, some major democratic deficiencies still 
remain in the customization and socialization of democratic norms as well as 
institutionalization of its electoralprocess (Fobih, 2012; Bratton, 1998). These deficiencies 
which constitute though far from exclusive, the crux of the country’s democratic construction 
and constancyhave not been adequately examined empirically by academics and policy -
makers.  This paper therefore explores and analyzes the challenges of socializing, 
customizing and institutionalizing democratic norms and values in Ghana’s hybrid -
democratic system (van de Walle, 2005). 
 The broad narrative of this paper consists of five sections. Following the introduction, 
it focuses on contradictory debates on Ghana’s electoral democratic success story under the 
Fourth Republic, with regard to the reemergence of the 1992 multi-party constitutional rule. 
The third section explores some of the issues that continue to pose major challenges to 
socialization and customization of democratic norms and values in Ghana. The fourth section 
deals withmethods of information gathering, summary of findings and discussions and 
follows with the fifth section which deals with conclusion and thensuggested institutional 
frameworks for addressing the challenges of electoral democratic construction. 
 
Ghana’s Electoral Democratic Success Story: Contradictory Debates 
 The volume of empirical literature on Ghana’s democratization is overwhelming 
(Gyimah-Boadi, 1994; 1999; 2001: 1999; 2009; Ninsin, 2006).  Scholars such as Haynes 
(2003) and Joseph (1998) argue that the internal socio-economic and political disorders 
coupled with disproportionate rate of public outcries and according to vande Walle (2005), 
the attaching of foreign aid and grants to democracy by the international donors augmented 
the domestic pressures on most African governments including Ghana to trigger political 
reforms.  Generally, optimism among Ghanaians grewas a result of the restoration of 
constitutional rule (Abdulai, 2009)and this assertion is confirmed by Gyimah-Boadi (2001) 
who notes that the return to constitutional rule in 1992 has given impetus to rating Ghana 
highly on some basic measures of democratic credentials including protection of fundamental 
civil liberties, human rights and media pluralism among other democratic outcomes. To 
buttress his point, Abdulai and Crawford (2008), Lindberg and Morrison (2008) and Daddieh 
(2011) confirm that, there have been periodic electoral democratic gains in Ghana. For 
instance, Abdulai and Crawford (2008) support Ghana’s periodic electoral democratic 
success story by indicating that Ghana has not only successfully conducted five free and fair 
general elections but also credited with five successful district elections.  
 Two contrasting positions have therefore come to dominate the discourses on Ghana’s 
democratization processes. While some Afro-optimist scholars such as (Abdulai, 2009; 
Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; Daddieh, 2011) argue that Ghana is the model of democracy in 
Africa and hence it is in the era of democratic triumphalism, on the contrary, other Afro-
pessimist scholars including (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Haynes, 2003; Jockers et 
al.,2010) contend that Ghana has since independence been experiencing a complex and 
contradictory historical legacy of democratic governance such that liberalism co-exists with 
patronage politics and hence it has not only been experimenting with democracy but also 
unable to construct and maintain credible democratic institutions and hence it is still in the 
era of trial of democracy. The new sociopolitical matrix being promoted in some countries in 
Africa including Ghana, which were previously dominated by authoritarian regimes, has led 
to the emergence or strengthening of opposition parties in order to challenge incumbent 
governments(Gyimah-Boadi, 2001;Yagboyaju, 2011; Keith  andLindberg, 2011). Hence the 
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drive towards electoral politics is a significant step in the direction of promoting democratic 
governance in many African countries of which Ghana is no exception.  
 Ghana’s democratic experience has been relatively stable though (Gyimah-Boadi, 
2001),merely holding frequent elections do not necessarily mean it has consolidated her 
democracy (Haynes, 2003).  Pervasive electoral manipulations coupled with political tension 
and acrimonies (for instance, Ghana’s 2012 elections petitions that lasted for over eight (8) 
months in 2013) give impression that Ghana’s Fourth Republic is in an era of trial of 
democracy rather than democratic triumphalism (van de Walle, 2005; Haynes, 2003).  
Democratization of state institutions and its politics in Ghana have failed to counteract the 
negative tendencies of patronage politics and its practiceand rather ledfurther toamplification 
of patronage politics (van de Walle, 2005; Lindberg, 2003). Pervasive patronage politics in 
itself is not only antithetical to democratic rule but also, has high propensity to propel 
political and social exclusivity and disorders and in so doing, it derails the process of 
deepening democracy and hence it tends to prevent democracy from consolidating itself 
(Bratton and van de Walle1997; deGrassi, 2008). 
 A cursory analysis of the history of democracy in Ghanaturns to prejudice the 
thinking towards democratic survivability in the country.According to Abdulai (2009), 
Ghana’s democratic practice since the mid -1960s has gone through chequered 
experiences.Hutchful (1989) and Luckham (1985) note that democratic rule in Ghana 
between 1960 and 1992 was interspersed with military rule.  Morrison (2004) and Abdulai 
(2009) attest to this fact by arguing that within the first two decades of the post- colonial 
Ghana, the country had experienced chequered multiple democratic governance.  
Consequently, Ghana was plunged into a decade of not only a military authoritarian rule but 
also a sturdy repressive rule characterized by a “culture of silence,” intimidation, human 
rights abuses and, worse of all, constant fear of ‘political assassination’ and indeed, ‘real 
assassinations’ (Oquaye, 2001; Abdulai, 2009).   Abdulai (2009) maintains that this 
oppressive rule coalesced with exclusivity turned to produce socio-economic disorders, 
political tension and general insecurity.  
 Chabal and Daloz (1999) theorize the outcome of such an appealing political 
conditions in Africa in general as characterized by i) an informalization of politics (i.e. 
Africa’s political system is not actually institutionalized because of pervasive personal rule 
and prevailing vertical links between patron and client, purposely and profitably holdingin 
sway democratic norms and values), ii)productivity of economic failures (Africa’s inability to 
develop due to dubious policy choices and external constraints constitute the logical outcome 
of a singular dynamic by which patrimonial networks are entrenched at the expense of the 
continent’s economic growth) as well as iii) re-traditionalization of society (the resurgence of 
ethnicity, witchcraft  and other cultural traits in Africa,  an indication of the continent’s move 
backward or evidence of its multi-faceted path to modernization).  Chabal and Daloz (1999) 
conclude that collectively, these elements spur pervasive political acrimonies or what they 
called political instrumentalization of disorders. Similarly, Chazan (1993; 1998:2) 
summarizes these political developments in Africa succinctly as “political disengagement” or 
“political recession.”  Some decades of deepening ‘political disengagement’ or ‘political 
recession’ and economic exclusivity resulted in cycle of repressive governance and politico-
economic alienation and hence the public tended to decry what they perceived to be 
“governmental illegitimacy” (Brobbey, 2009)(See fig.1). 
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Fig. 1Vicious Cycle of Repressive Rule- Citizens’ Alienation and Legitimacy Crisis in Ghana 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As a result, Ghana over the years has been experiencing a crisis of legitimacy (Aidoo, 
2008; Brobbey, 2009; Abdulai 2009). As fig 1 shows, Ghana’s Fourth Republic has since 
been suffering from crisis of legitimacy. This is as a result of an absence of countervailing 
authority to hold the excessive powers of the presidency in check. Worse still , the Articles 
70(1a-e and 2), 74(1), 78(1), 79(1), 86(2,I and vi), 89(2a,i-iii and 2d), 144(1-5) among others  
of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution endorse  winner-take-all systemand also guarantee the 
presidency  gargantuan powers not only to control both political power and economic 
resources but also antagonize the oppositions and  invariably exclude them from national 
governance.Thiswinner-take-all systemcoupled with economic marginalization and state’s 
inability to ensure development accordingly lead Ghanaians to agitate for political inclusion 
and economic assimilation. Often government’s failure to open up the political space to 
include the oppositions coalescedwith masses’ economic alienationfurthercompel the citizens 
to question the legitimacy of the government. Thus persistent political exclusion and 
economic marginalization coupled with repressive governance give impetus to further 
questioning the governmental legitimacy and hence a vicious cycle of repressive rule and 
legitimacy crisis (jeopardy). Indeed, the level of legitimacy jeopardy is inconsistent with the 
generally held view that Ghana is a beacon of democracy and a model in the African 
continent.  
 Ghana’s experiment with the winner-take-all electoral politics after over two decades 
has given impetus to hotly and contested debates. The two overly emerged schools of 
thoughts include those who hold the view that ‘winner-take-all’ politics in the Ghanaian body 
politic has not been helpful due to its inherent ‘politics of exclusivity’ and economic 
marginalization (Ala-Adjetey, 2005; IEA, 2013). The other group maintains that it is a good 
practice because it makes governance easy and therefore must be maintained. The point of 
departure of this paper is that the pro winner-take-all group focuses exclusively on the 
governability and rather glosses over legitimacy and the degree of autonomy (an all-
inclusiveness).  
 Empirical evidence, contrary to both the anti and pro winner-take all, revealed that 
“the challenge of Ghana’s governance structure does not only reflect winner-take-all system 
per se (albeit its extensive criticisms as promoting zero sum power struggle, hyper-aggressive 
way of winning power or winning power by all means) but also unacceptable political culture 
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and attitudes of politicians in particular and most Ghanaians in general.”37Further evidence 
revealed that “Ghanaians would not be so bothered about who rules, reigns or governs the 
country proviso the individuals can be better-off or well- off in a given conducive economy ( 
in which businesses could thrive, ensure economic boom, political stability etc.) and that 
rather, it is imperative to initiate political culture and attitudinal reforms.”38In a similar 
interview, it was revealed that “politicians do not only seek power to amass wealth but also to 
promote patronage politics at the exclusion of the opposition and non-party acolytes.”39 In 
view of this, “there is the need to address the issues of corrupt practices and selfish interested 
politics that have become pervasive among politicians and the electorate alike.40 “A major 
blame should rather be heaped on the ill-manner at which politicians conduct themselves in 
the electoral processes.” In fact, this paper shares this view and maintains that the general 
conduct of Ghanaians isoften very detrimental to healthy democratic practice. Admittedly, 
the bad attitudes of politicians often play down the political culture, norms and values in the 
Ghanaian body politic.   
 Meanwhile, an analysis of the process of democratic consolidation in Ghana reveals 
that all is not well (Haynes, 2003; Van de Walle, 2005).  The erratic nature of the process of 
democratic consolidation as the evidence in this paper confirms, has generated an interesting 
contending and contradictory debate.  While Jockers et al. (2010) hold the view that Ghana’s 
democratic consolidation is a “convenient myth”and conclude that Ghana's democratic 
system is rather not ingrained and not consolidating, a view which does sound like a 
repetition of van de Walle's (2005) position that democracy in Ghana is “merely surviving” 
and not consolidating, also seems to conflict with others such as  Lindberg and Morrison’s 
(2008) who argue that democracy in Ghana is consolidating  because it exhibits signs of 
“matured“ democracy.  
 The Afro- pessimist scholars argue that  the sudden democratic reversals in some 
parts of Africa such as the political assassination of President Melchior Nduadaye of Burundi 
in 1993 after only four months in office, the military putsch that overthrew the democratically 
and constitutionally elected President of the Gambia in 1994, the coup that almost 
destabilized the Republic of Togo in the immediate post-Eyadema era and  recently, the 
political turbulence in Mali among other  political upheavals41 in other parts of Africa are 
sufficient evidence of the disruptive potentialities inherent in Africa’s latest efforts at 
democratization. Thus, enduring patronage networks politics is indeed, an antithetical to the 
process of consolidating democracy in Ghana (deGrassi, 2008; van de Walle, 2005).  
Institutionalization of patronage politics has, and continues to hold sway inthe 
democratization of state institutions and its politics and hence democratic experience in 
Ghana presents an impressive façade.   
 Given the controversy over the process of democratic consolidation in Ghana, the 
position of this paper is that widespread patronage proclivities though far from exclusive, 
constitute the difficult and daunting task which impedes the process of consolidating 
democracy. Thus, an all important question which one needs to ponder and reflect is how 
precisely or exactly does it impede it or to what extent does patronage politicsconstitute an 
impediment to the process of deepening democracy in Ghana?The point of departure of this 
                                                          
37An interview with Dr. Samuel Bekoe , the President of UTAG during the consultation on the issue of winner-
takes- all interaction organized by Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA),  IEA’s Conference Hall. Accra, July 14, 
2014.  
38 ibid 
39ibid 
40 ibid 
41Other political upheavals include, the usurpation of power by the military in Madagascar and the Republic of 
Guinea, political violence in Kenya and recently, the coup d’état in Egypt.   
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paper is that multiple factors, complex and contradictory in nature simultaneously spur and 
negate democratic constancy. Out of these factors, patronage politics bears an inordinate 
(holding all other factors constant) responsibility. In what follows this paper explores and 
analyzes the multiple factors that pose ominous challenges to Ghana’s electoral democratic 
construction, constancy and the socialization and customization of democratic norms and 
values in the Ghanaian body politic.  
  
Challenges of Socializing and Customizing Democratic Norms and Values in Ghana 
 The idea of the system of democracy under either a parliamentary or presidential 
system of government is associated with elections, because an election is indispensable 
mechanism in promoting democratic governance in contemporary democracies (Frempong, 
2011). In the discussion of the importance of elections in the process of democratic 
consolidation, Huntington (1991) noted that, ‘elections are inevitable aspects of democracy 
so democracy is unthinkable without elections.’ Elections play a critical role in democratic 
development and consolidation in both advanced and emerging democracies across the world 
and constitute an integral part of contemporary democratic practice (Frempong, 2011).  
 Someobjectives very central to elections include serving as the springboard for 
members to compete for votes and power, and controlling policy-making in the state. 
Winning elections helps to form a government and to contribute effectively towards shaping 
public policy by generating reliable information for the public, raising the electorates’ 
political awareness and promoting government accountability (Agyeman-Duah, 
2005).Elections also serve as a means by which members are offered opportunities to 
exercise their franchise to seat or unseat presidential candidates as well as members of the 
legislative bodies (Frempong, 2011). While the citizens of Ghana under the Fourth Republic 
have taken some important steps toward promoting democracy and made significant inroads 
in sustaining the country’s democracy, as well as developing its electoral system in the post-
transition era, it continues to face a number of institutional and behavioural challenges 
(Fobih, 2011; Brobbey, 2009). The findings in the study highlight some of the fundamental 
challenges facing the electoral process and the consolidation of democracy in Ghana, which 
require the effort of politicians, government officials and institutions as well as the entire 
citizenry to find better solutions to these problems.  
 To begin with, one of the central issues that obstruct electoral politics in Ghana is 
widespread patronage politics characterized the democratic procedures at the level of 
primaries,districts and general elections(Lindberg, 2003; van de Walle, 2005; Fobih, 
2011).Widespread patronagepolitics characterizes party membershipdrives and all levels of 
elections constitute some of the central issues in Ghana’s electoral politics (Frempong, 2011; 
Fobih, 2011). The electoral campaign platforms of political parties and community and 
individual voter electoral decisions are guided by patronage. Parties in Ghana solicit support 
and membership by offering promises of petty patronage incentives and future development 
programmes to communities. Donations made to communities come along with the political 
message and are indirectly intended to offer the politicians the opportunity to promote their 
party’s interests at such community gatherings42. This inducement often influence would-be 
members or guide voters in their decision to support one party over another (Frempong, 
2011).  
 As Ninsin (2006) noted, through this kind of relationship, voters create opportunities 
for their communities’ improvement both by soliciting development programmes and 
simultaneously trying to achieve the maximum material gains to improve their living 
conditions. Likewise, according to Anthony Downs(1957),as rationale beings who sought to 
                                                          
42 The Western Regional Secretary of the NDC notedin 2005 campaign platform (See Fobih, 2011). 
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maximize their utility, voters choose a party or a candidate on the basis   of the benefits that 
were likely to accrue to them when that party or candidate took over the reins of power. 
Downs (1957) presents a rational calculus of voting that has inspired much of the later work 
on voting and turnout. Particularly significant was his conclusion that a rational voter should 
almost never bother to vote. This conclusion, especially as elaborated on by Riker and 
Ordeshook (1968) has shifted the attention of modern political scientists from explaining why 
people don't vote to explaining why they do though. Downs(1957) notes that the “swing 
electorate” are generally located in the middle of the political spectrum, so obviously 
politicians would spend an inordinate amount of time and resources trying to woo these so-
called independent or what  he calls the ‘median voters’ or ‘persuadable voters.’ On the 
contrary, this paper finds this assertion too generalized and fallacious in that how could 
politicians be very sure that all the electorate who receive incentive actually vote for them. 
The available empirical evidence has been that some electorate in some circumstances, are 
made to swear an oath of loyalty in exchange for electoral incentives43. However, this act is 
not often prevalent in all other constituencies. 44  
 Meeting a community’s socioeconomic needs boosts the community’s confidence in 
that party to meet its collective interest. It is also a way of forging a new social contract with 
an elected government, which means benefiting from the distribution of development projects 
and patronage to groups and individuals (Lindberg, 2003). Due to patronage in Ghana’s party 
system, voters’ choice of candidates or parties is very often guided by the view that the 
candidates or parties should serve as a link between them and the state in the distribution or 
allocation of financial and material resources (Lindberg, 2003). In this regard, it does not 
only create a linkage between one’s willingness to support a party and its candidates, and the 
expectation of reward in the form of development projects and other resources for the 
community, after winning the election but also lead to collective political behaviour (for 
example, voting in Ashanti (NPP’s stronghold) and in Volta (NDC’s stronghold) has always 
been reflecting “block voting” (Jockers et al. 2010). 
 While some patronage practices, such as meeting community development needs, 
may be acceptable in political competition and even occur in the advanced democracies, other 
strategies used by parties in Ghana to induce  prospective members and win votes during 
elections are unacceptable and give rise to clientelism(Fobih, 2011). Personalities and 
clientelist networks predominate in Ghana’s party system, since some politicians and public 
officials regard politics and public office as a means to personal enrichment at the expense of 
public interests, and use state power and resources to cultivate political loyalties largely on 
the basis of ethnic and regional solidarity (Joseph, 1998). Some party leaders at the 
constituency level claim that the party leaders at the national and regional levels control 
power and resources, and distribute patronage to the members at the grassroots, constituency 
and unit levels (Joseph, 1998). For example, at the constituency and unit levels, there is a 
strong presence of patron–client relationships between the party leaders and the grassroots 
members (van de Walle, 2005).  
 Whereas parties and their candidates ‘grease the electorates’ palm’ to gain their 
support and votes, the majority of the electorate in Ghana also believe that ‘pulling the right 
strings and knocking on the right doors’ by supporting a winning party could offer them 
benefits in the form of jobs, material gains and other favours for themselves and their 
communities, which they believe serve as a trade-off for their votes (Lindberg, 2003; van de 
Walle, 2005). It is therefore common knowledge in Ghanaian politics that some candidates 
and parties offer financial and material incentives in the form of bribes to potential individual 
                                                          
43An interview with some  constituency members of the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC)  Madina, a 
Sub-burb of Accra, Ghana  prior to 2012 general elections 
44Ibid. 
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voters and supporters, ranging from money, clothes and sewing machines, to other material 
goods (Lindberg, 2003; Fobih, 2011)or in the form of what this paper refers to as ‘social 
massage.’ 
 Due to the patron–client relationship between the party’s elites and the grassroots 
members, membership in Ghana’s political parties is categorized into two main classes, 
namely the ‘Big Men and Small Boys’ (Nugent, 1996). Indeed, some of the so-called ‘Big 
Men’ who constitute the leadership and wealthy members of the party sometimes enter 
politics to acquire wealth and/or increase their wealth in order to enable them to play key 
roles within the party(Nugent, 1996). This act indeed, has led some scholars to conclude that 
elections feed patronage politics or counteract it (Lindberg, 2003; van de Walle, 2005). This 
paper argues that elections invariably ‘grease the wheel of progress.’   And hence Bayart 
(1993) has associated those politicians with self-centered and greed politics and thus 
concludes that they engage in what he calls the ‘politics of the belly.’ 
 In the meantime,  Clapham (1985) notes in his discussion of African politics that 
patron–client relationship is fundamentally a one of exchange in which a superior (patron) 
provides financial and material support to the inferior (the client), and the client, in turn, 
provides support for the patron. The base of this is an unequal relationship between patrons 
and clients, and the benefits accruing to each of them from the exchange may be uneven 
(Clapham, 1985). The ‘Big Men’ distribute part of their financial and material acquisitions in 
the form of social benefits to the lower classes, who have been termed ‘Small Boys’ and who 
are more or less uneducated, poor grassroots supporters, mostly in rural, but also in urban 
areas,in exchange for political rights(Lindberg, 2003: 2010; Nugent, 1996).  
 In this way, power is concentrated in the hands of the ‘Big Men’ and the members in 
the lower ranks of the party not only serve the interest of the leaders, but also have a limited 
chance of upward mobility in the parties’ leadership (Nugent, 1996). As Fox (1994) rightly 
noted, clientelism is a form of social and political control. Hence political parties and some 
voters see patron–client relations as an exchange of favours between the parties and the 
electorate as some people are co-opted by the parties through various forms of patronage 
(Fobih, 2011).  
 During the Rawlings’ NDC era, contracts were awarded to individuals ‘not for reason 
of professional competence, but political partisanship’, and contractors perceived to be 
members of the opposition parties were victimized (Fobih, 2011). While bribery in elections 
is a crime and is seriously monitored in many advanced democracies, in Ghana this practice 
has so permeated the party system that the party leaders and supporters do not see anything 
wrong with patron–client relations (van de Walle, 2005). 
 
Methods, Summary of Findings and Discussions  
 The data for this paper came from books, scholarly articles from peer review journals, 
magazines and newspaper reports.  A semi-structured intellectual elite interview (productive 
Dialogue) was utilized in information gathering in respect of qualitative primary dataas well 
as patronage analytical framework was deployed. Using purposive sampling technique, this 
paper investigated the politics of Ghana’s democratic stability in the light of widespread 
cronyism and nepotism.  Findings of this paper are two-fold, theoretical and empirical.  
 Theoretically, it revealed that patronage politics is not only so widespread than 
academics have acknowledged but also Ghana has a contradictory historical legacy of 
democratic governance. Both liberalism and patronage politics do not only co-exist but also 
interwoven.  This however, makes it difficult to distinguish what is socially considered a gift 
from political inducement. While liberalism promotes debates and dissenting views, 
patronage politics engenders sycophancy, corrupt practices and disenfranchises the electorate.  
As already indicated, after over two decades of re-democratizationpatronage politics and 
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liberalism do not only exist side by side but also patronage politics is much more pervasive 
than liberalism. The simultaneous existence of patronage politics and issue-based politics 
tend to obscure the deepening of democracy and its constancy. Suffice to say that patronage 
politics is a global phenomenon, the extent to which it is embraced in the Ghanaian body 
politic needs much to be desired. It is associated with corrupt practice though it is not illegal 
and as such does not receive social censure. It is publicly circumscribed but privately resorted 
to.  Consequently, Ghana has since the inception of 1992 multiparty democracy been 
experiencing chequered periods of democracy and policy shortermism. 
 Empirically, it revealed that “Ghanaians are practicing what Akan people call “Kabi 
na menkabi amanbuo” to wit“freedom of speech” or for want of better expression “No Action 
Talking Only (NATO) democracy.”Patronage politics is much more entrenched than has been 
acknowledged by academics or researchers. A clear case of patronage political entrenchment 
was well articulated by one of my respondents as follows: “this network you are talking about 
has a historical antecedent, our forefathers, fathers and even contemporaries deploy it as a 
social network  mechanism for not only strengthening national integration but also serve as a 
foundation for social capital development.” He added, “apart from serving as ‘interim social 
relief,’ it also ensures redistribution of state resources.”  Another respondent indicated 
that:“In Ghana today, you may find it extremely difficult to  get a job, secure contract, 
appointments or even gets admission if you do not know any big man” and/or, if the big man 
does not know you.”  “In absence of a ‘connection’ or ‘networks’, nothing really works!” 
Several of such responses have been encountered in the field.It is instructive to point out that, 
a number of popular Akan adages including for instance; “ Ebi she w’anomu  a  ena wotobi a 
ebene” to wit “A bird in hand worth two in the bush;”  “Ketewa bi ara nswa” meaning  “Little 
mercy also deserve appreciation,” indeed, reinforce the entrenchment of patronage politics in 
the Ghanaian body politic. An overwhelming majority of the respondents interestingly, 
claimed that they often receive “the fair share of the national cake through the distribution of 
resources by the politicians and therefore they find nothing wrong with that.”This indeed, 
corroborated Lindberg’s (2003) earlier study which argues that “‘It’s our time to Chop”:  
 The entrenched patronage politicstherefore distorts the process of electoral democratic 
institutionalization (especially, through buying of votes, (Bratton, 2008). Indeed, these 
findings are inconsistent with Lindberg and Morrison (2008) who claim that Ghanaian voters 
often vote on the basis of an evaluative –rationale (previous performance) rather than on non-
evaluative-rationale basis (such as buying of votes).  
 Since the inception of multiparty democratic politics, the Ashanti Region45 still 
remains the stronghold of the NPP, while the Volta Region46 also remains the stronghold of 
the NDC. Ironically, neither NPP nor NDC has ever won elections (in the case of 
presidential) when put all votes in their strongholds alone together. 47 However, it is only 
recently that NPP and NDC made some inroads regarding obtaining some votes (albeit 
insignificant) from Volta and Ashanti regions respectively. Leading members of the two 
parties attested to the fact that “the political divide is so entrenched to the extent that even if a 
“tree’ is covered with NPP’s party colours to contest an election with NDC candidate (albeit 
popular supports and better social standing) in the Ashanti region, the NDC candidate is 
destined to experience a humiliating defeat.”  Similarly, if a “stone” is covered with NDC’s 
party colours and to contest an election with NPP candidate (albeit popular supports and high 
                                                          
45Bantama, a suburb of Kumasi, the capital of Ashanti Region is considered “the World Bank” of the NPP,Daily 
Guide September, 2012. 
46Ketu South, a suburb of Ho, the capital of Volta Region is also noted to be “the Florida” of the NDC,Daily 
Guide September, 2012,   
47Morrison, M. K. C “Political Parties in Ghana through Four Republics:” A Path to Democratic Consolidation’, 
Comparative Politics. Journal of Democracy.. (2004) 
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social reputation) in Volta region, the NPP candidate is also no doubt to experience an 
embarrassing defeat.”48 
 These responses however reaffirm the degree of penetration of both nepotism and 
cronyism in the Ghanaian body politic. 
 
Conclusion and Suggestions 
 On the basis of the findings discussed, this paper draws a number of conclusions. 
First, on the theoretical level, Ghana is a model of Africa’s democracy though evidence of 
interwoven of patronage and liberalism reaffirms that Ghana’s democratic politics gives an 
impressive façade.Besides, patronage politics is not only a complex and a contradictory 
phenomenon but also versatile, and that theoretical versatility is an asset for the study of a 
complex phenomenon such as electoral politics in new democracies. Second, empirically, the 
country’s relative electoral democratic success story is largely cosmetic.Patronage politics 
serves as electoral incentive/inducement (particularly, for voter turnouts) as well as 
disenfranchises electorate (i.e. through buying of votes), It is publicly denounced but 
privately resorted to. It is considered to be corrupt practice even though it is not illegal and 
hence does not receive any social censure. Finally, the amplification of patronage politics 
dims active civic political participation, whilst a reduction in patronage politics would 
promote active civic political participation in Ghana. The path to wholesome practice of 
democracy can be difficult especially on the African continent.  
 This paper thereforerecommends behavioural reforms which would not only promote 
domestication and socialization of democratic norms, culture and values but also making it 
internalizeable and enforceable.The process of democratic consolidation does not only 
require minimization of the level of patronage politics and promotion of issue-based politics 
but also building of strong institutions as opposed to ‘strong men.’After over two decades of 
Ghana’s practice of liberalism, patron-client networks has been much more pervasive than 
liberalism and hence policy-makers and stakeholders should find ways to discourage 
patronage politics.  Institutionalization of electoral politics should not only focus on 
shepherding the process of campaigning but also provide legitimate political contact methods 
as part of general overhaul of the institutions of democratic elections.  With tolerance, 
innovation, confidence in relevant institutions and willingness to place public interest above 
individual preference much would be achieved by way of deepening democratic practice. It is 
hoped that the Ghanaians woulddeem it necessary tostrengthen the relevant institutional 
structures to consolidate the relative landmarks or gains made so far. 
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